NeoWestern business-government relations: the case of Poland

This article investigates the applicability of Western models of business-government relations to the postcommunist context. Given the absence of a business-government relationship over the forty years of communism, it seems perfectly plausible that postcommunist countries should produce a historically unprecedented form of business-government relations and a new type of capitalist democracy. On the other hand, these countries have for several years been unequivocally regarded as capitalist democracies so it also seems possible that a literature developed for Western capitalist democracies should be useful in the postcommunist context. This article argues that, in spite of their assertions to the contrary, postcommunist studies propose no new concepts or variables for the study of business-government relations. Moreover, a detailed case study of Poland demonstrates the applicability of Western models to a postcommunist context. The confrontation between Western models and postcommunist data does not "stretch" the models but, in some important respects, actually clarifies them

If money talks, what does it say? Varieties of capitalism and business financing of parties

Do business contributions to political parties convey different messages in different countries, and, if so, why? This is the first cross-national study of firm behaviour in political finance. It understands motivations for contributions to parties as either ideological or pragmatic. Motivation is inferred by quantitatively relating the payments of 960 firms to variations in political competition in three countries over periods of between seven and seventeen years. In co-ordinated Germany, a small number of firms make ideological payments. In liberal Canada and Australia, large numbers of firms made pragmatic payments. Australia’s left-right party system created an awareness of policy risk, which motivated ideological payments, but there was no ideological bias in business financing of politics in Canada’s unusually non-ideological party system. The statistical analysis is supplemented by a qualitative investigation of discrete and reciprocal exchanges between businesses and political parties

The logic of post-communist capitalist collective inaction

The relationship between politics and business is obviously a key feature of policy-making in capitalist democracies, and business associations are an important element of that relationship. A consensus has now emerged that organised business is remarkably weak in East-Central Europe. This article proposes a theoretical synthesis with which to explain that weakness. It shows how the strength of trade unions, varieties of capitalism and interest diversity are specifications of Olson’s logic of collective action, specifications without which the logic itself is too general to explain concrete outcomes. Detailed evidence in favour of the theory is provided from the Polish case. It is argued that the analysis should also apply to other post-communist countries

Semi-presidentialism and democratisation in Poland

Polish semi-presidentialism evolved from a pacted transition between the leadership of the communist regime and the Solidarity opposition movement. The mechanics of semi-presidentialism, as well as its effect on democratisation, depend upon the constitution, the party system and the personality of the president. Poland has had three semi-presidential constitutions, a variety of relationships between president and government as well as government and parliament, and two very different presidents. In the early years, the absence of the conditions for stable semi-presidentialism had a negative effect on democratisation. Later on, conditions were more supportive, and semi-presidentialism began to play a more positive role. Before the introduction of semi-presidentialism in November 1990, Polish elites had already established a firm consensus on democracy, which was buttressed by consensus on the economic system and international relations. Therefore, the conflicting legitimacies generated by semi-presidentialism delayed but did not prevent, or seriously threaten, democratic consolidation in Poland

Process and text: teaching students to review the literature

Examiners of dissertations regularly have to endure “literature reviews” that consist of extended lists of mini-summaries of books. Indeed, quite often “dissertations” amount to little more than a list of book-summaries masquerading as an argument. While there are excellent courses on qualitative and quantitative methods, most students have learnt how to conduct literature reviews exclusively through the method of learning by doing. Ultimately, there is no alternative to this age-old method. However, this essay is premised on the belief that a brief attempt to understand the general function of a literature review in political science should make learning by doing easier and more productive

Divided executives and democratisation

This article examines the effect of a divided executive on democratisation in mixed systems where presidents are directly elected and prime ministers are responsible to the legislature. A divided executive is where the president and prime minister are not from the same party. The importance of a divided executive is hypothesised to vary according to the relative powers of the president and prime minister. In mixed systems where either the president or the prime minister is the dominant actor, then a divided executive will not affect democratisation. However, where both the president and prime minister have significant independent powers, then a divided executive should have a negative impact on democratisation because of the potential for destabilising intraexecutive conflict. Using an ordinal logit model, the results show that mixed systems with a dual executive do not perform significantly worse than mixed systems where there is one dominant actor. This suggests that the standard wisdom about the impact of a divided executive in a mixed system is misplaced

Business, politics and money in Australia: testing economic, political and ideological explanations

The flow of business money to political parties is a vital issue for Australian democracy. Nonetheless, there has been no systematic study of why Australian businesses contribute to political parties and why they contribute more to one party than to others. I exploit Australian Electoral Commission data on payments to parties by 450 large businesses over seven years at the Commonwealth and State levels. Economic characteristics (income and sector) are important to understanding which businesses make political contributions. However, they are little help in understanding how businesses distribute their cash. This is best interpreted as an interaction of ideological bias and political pragmatism. If Labor has the political advantage businesses tend to split contributions evenly between the ALP and the Coalition. If the Coalition has the political advantage businesses overwhelmingly target their contributions on the Liberal and National parties

Time to travel in search of the political market

The central tension in capitalist democracy comes from the clash between votes and money. This conflict is at its most direct when money is seen to influence public policy at the expense of voters. According to the theory of the political market, political contributions by business are investments in favourable policy outcomes. The question of whether there is a political market has been one of the most enduring sources of controversy in the history of capitalist democracy across the globe. Moreover, business payments to politicians have been studied intensively by one influential group of political scientists: the specialists on the United States. Unfortunately, this subject has not presented an opportunity for political science to make an important contribution to the debate on a matter of enormous public concern. These political scientists have a very plausible theory but have not been able muster much direct support for the theory. They need a new theory or new evidence. I argue that the theory is good and that it is time to look for new evidence beyond the United States

Light simulations for assessment in social science

Simulations are an increasingly popular way of teaching social science, but are sometimes viewed as too complex and resource-intensive for assessment. This practice paper introduces the concept of a light simulation, one that is simple enough to be used for an individual written assessment. It provides examples from a variety of politics courses at under and post-graduate levels and in medium-sized and large classes. It also describes the super-light simulation, which does not require a live precursor to be an effective assessment. The article also reflects on how light simulations can prevent plagiarism, promote engagement, and contribute to an assessment portfolio that still includes the traditional essay

Business financing of politics in Ireland: Theory, evidence and reform

This article takes a new perspective on business and politics in Ireland from the comparative literature on business financing of politics. It introduces a theoretical language based on the concepts of ideological and pragmatic donations and discrete and reciprocal exchange. It goes on to discuss the extent to which the Irish political system generates incentives for these types of behaviour. Its empirical core is a quantitative analysis of disclosed donations to TDs between 2002 and 2009, but it also exploits anecdotal and official sources. This study concludes that there has been considerable scope for the exchange of brokerage services in reciprocation for small disclosed donations. Current reform proposals will reduce but not eliminate this potential, especially if there is no enumeration of commercial payments and loans received by politicians and parties